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Abstract 
Bank risk is not directly observable, so empirical research relies 
on indirect measures. We evaluate how well Z-score, the widely 
used accounting-based measure of bank distance to default, can 
predict bank failure. Using the U.S. commercial bank data from 
2004 to 2012, we find that on average Z-score can predict 76% of 
bank failure, and additional set of other bank- and macro-level 
variables do not increase this predictability level. Finally, we 
obtain that the prediction power of Z-score to predict bank 
default remains stable within the three-year forward window. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper assesses the validity of Z-score proposed by Boyd 
and Graham (1986) as a bank risk measure. Z-score has been widely 
applied as an indicator of bank’s distance-to-default in both 
academic research and practice. It is calculated as the sum of 
bank’s return on assets and equity to assets ratio divided by the 
standard deviation of return on assets. It is an estimate of the 
number of standard deviations below the mean that bank’s profits 
would have to fall to make the bank’s equity negative. Higher 
values of Z-score are thus indicative of low probability of 
insolvency and greater bank stability. The attractiveness of Z-
score relies on the fact that it does not require strong 
assumptions about the distribution of returns on assets (Boyd and 
Graham, 1986; Hannan and Hanweck, 1988; Strobel, 2011), which 
represents an especially interesting advantage from the 
practitioner’s point of view. The popularity of Z-score also 
originates from its relative simplicity and the capability to 
compute it using solely accounting information. Contrary to 
market-based risk measures, which are computable just for listed 
financial institutions and may raise estimation concerns stemming 
from the size of available samples, Z-score is applicable when 
dealing with an extensive number of unlisted as well as listed 
entities.  
Despite the advantages attributable to the Z-score, however, 
it is not immune from some caveats. First, its reliability depends 
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on the quality of underlying accounting and auditing framework. 
Such an issue is more prominent in cross-country studies due to 
the degree of each country’s institutional development. Second, as 
banks may smooth out accounting data over time, the Z-score may 
offer an excessively positive assessment of the risk of bank 
insolvency. Third, by definition, Z-score is highly sensitive to 
the standard deviation of ROA.
1
 In addition, given the tendency of 
the dominance of equity to assets ratio in calculating bank’s Z-
score, the magnitude of the differences in Z-scores may not 
correspond linearly to the differences in bank risk, since the 
variation of ROA is only a minor part of the calculation in the 
numerator.
2
 Furthermore, as suggested by Huizinga and Laeven 
(2012), banks tend to overstate their value of distressed assets 
and regulatory capital during the U.S. mortgage crisis, and the 
calculation of Z-score based on the accounts reported by the 
bankers may thus be biased upward towards a safer ratio. Hence, 
despite the popularity of Z-score in banking literature as a proxy 
for distance-to-default given its soundness in theory, how well it 
perms in forecasting default is still unknown.  
                                                          
1
 For example, consider two banks A and B, both with equity ratio being 0.04. 
Bank A has average ROA being 0.01 and standard deviation of ROA being 0.001, 
hence the Z-score for Bank A is 50. While Bank B has higher ROA of 0.02, 
however, its standard deviation of ROA is also significantly higher, with being 
0.002. Thus Bank B’s Z-score is 30. Although both banks have proportional ROAs 
(0.01 vs. 0.02) and its standard deviations (0.001 vs. 0.002), Z-score shows 
that Bank A is twice as safe as Bank B. 
2 Our data shown in Table 2 indicates that average equity to assets ratio is 11% 
while average ROA is only 0.9%. Therefore, unless a bank has consistently 
considerable loss over time, Z-score is more likely to be dominated by changes 
in equity to asset ratios than changes in ROA. 
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In this study, we attempt to answer this question. 
Specifically, we examine two research questions. First, we examine 
whether Z-score is a sufficient statistic to predict bank failure. 
Second, we investigate whether the predicting power of bank 
failures could significantly increase by adding additional bank-
specific and macro variables in the forecasting model. We test 
these empirical questions in the following ways. We incorporate 
various versions of Z-score into a complementary log-logistic 
(clog-log) model that determines US bank failure from 2004 through 
2012. Considering both Type I and II errors, we compare the 
performance of three bank failure prediction models that: (i) 
include Z-score as the only predictor, (ii) include a set of bank- 
(other than Z-score) and macro-level variables as the predictors, 
and (iii) include only the combination of the set of bank- and 
macro-level variables as the predictors. Further, we compare the 
short-term, out-of-sample forecasting ability of Z-score to that 
of the combination of Z-score and a set of bank- and macro-level 
variables. Finally, we examine the ability of Z-score to explain 
Merton Distance-to-default, a market based bank risk measure.  
We find strong empirical evidence to provide affirmative 
answer for both questions. First, we find that on average, Z-score 
together with time fixed effects are able to predict bank failures 
with the accuracy of 76% (based on Type I errors), while adding a 
set of other bank-specific and macro variables do not increase the 
predictability accuracy. Besides, the out-of-sample forecasting 
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performance of Z-score shows that the lowest two deciles of Z-
score can predict on average 74% of bank failures across the whole 
sample. We also find that Z-score is a significant determinant 
factor of Merton DD measure, indicative of high correlation 
between the two widely used bank risk measures. Finally, we show 
that the prediction power of Z-score remains stable within the 
forward three-year window.  
Assessing the Z-score’s accuracy in measuring bank risk is 
important for several reasons. First, since a bank’s risk is not 
directly observable, the empirical literature finds itself having 
to rely on indirect proxies, which should be sound both 
theoretically and empirically. Even though Z-score is a widely 
used bank risk measure among many researchers and practitioners, 
its statistical properties are not yet known. It is hence 
important to demonstrate the validity of this measure, and whether 
it can indeed reflect the underlying bank risk. Second, given the 
simplicity and transparency of the calculation of Z-score, 
establishing its predictive power for bank failures would have 
extensive implications for both policy makers and practitioners, 
who are currently looking for effective measure of bank risk in 
their policy making process or risk management of the banking 
sector. Third, given that our measures of Z-score does not rely on 
whether the bank is publicly traded, it can be widely applied to 
both publicly listed banks and private banks, and this is an 
important advantage over most systemic risk measures proposed so 
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far that are heavily based on stock price information of the bank 
(see, e.g., Acharya et al., 2012; Billio et al., 2012). Fourth, 
establishing Z-score as an effective predictor for bank failure in 
our empirical study also implies that the disclosure quality 
regarding bank’s earnings and equity is crucial to improve 
information environment for banks, and that any managerial 
incentives or regulations that give rise to earnings smoothing in 
the banking industry might lead to under-estimation of default 
risk by outsiders.
3
 
Our paper also contributes to the current surging literature 
on various factors that may lead to bank failure. These literature 
examine both micro-level factors such as bank ownership and 
corporate governance, subprime lending and loan securitization, as 
well as macro-level factors such as bank competition and 
regulations (see, e.g., Akins et al., 2014; Beck et al., 2013; 
Brown and Dinc, 2011; DeYoung and Torna, 2013; Erkens, 2012; 
Gorton and Metrick, 2012; Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; 
Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 2010; Repullo and Suarez, 2013).  
Our paper also complements to Altman’s (1968) Z-score based 
on multiple discriminant analysis (Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006). 
Altman proposes a model of five variables to predict bankruptcy up 
to “two years prior to distress and that accuracy diminishes 
                                                          
3
 In this sense, our study is also related to Jin et al. (2011) who develop six 
and ten accounting and audit quality variables to predict whether banks failed 
during the financial crisis starting from 2007.  For recent studies on 
managerial incentives that give rise to earnings smoothing for financial 
industries, see Cheng et al. (2011) and Eckles et al. (2011), and for 
discussions on how regulations could change earnings smoothing incentives for 
bank managers, see Kilic et al. (2012). 
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substantially as the lead time increases” (Altman, 2000).4 However, 
as well spelled out in these studies, the Altman’s (1968) Z-score 
(along with the Altman et al.’s (1977) Zeta credit risk model, or 
the 2000 modified Z-score) is mostly applicable to industrial 
corporations instead of banks.  
We organize the remainder of this paper as follows. Section 2 
describes the data sample and how we identify failure events. 
Section 3 discusses the methodology as well as the variables used 
in our paper and their descriptive statistics. Section 4 and 5 
present empirical results and robustness tests. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Data 
We obtain fourth-quarter data from 2003 to 2012 on private 
and public commercial banks in the U.S. from the Reports on 
Condition and Income (“Call Reports”) submitted by insured banks 
to the Federal Reserve.
5
 Following Berger et al. (2004), we study 
only commercial banks and exclude savings banks, savings and loan 
associations, credit unions, investment banks, mutual banks, and 
credit card banks We use bank-level data and treat each 
individually chartered bank as a separate entity.  
                                                          
4  The variables used in his 1968 seminal study are: (1) working capital/total 
assets, (2) retained earnings/total assets, (3) earnings before interest and 
taxes/total assets, (4) market value equity/book value of total liabilities, 
and (5) sales/total assets. Given that the initial model was developed to 
predict failure of publicly traded listed manufacturing firms, later in Altman 
(2000), Altman modified his original model to predict failures in private and 
in publicly traded listed non-manufacturing firms (1984), known as the 
"revised" or "alternative" Z-score model. 
5  We use yearly data instead of quarterly data to minimize the seasonal effects 
of bank performance.  
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Our final sample consists of 8,478 unique banks (there are 
total 58,017 bank-year observations), out of which 552 failed and 
7,926 are active. The information on bank failure is obtained from 
the inactive bank data provided by Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC). The FDIC lists all banks that were closed 
owing to bankruptcy, merger and acquisition (M&A) and change of 
charter among other causes of closure, and provides a structural 
change coding for the reason for closure and the date of closure. 
We define these bank closures as failure. Table 1 presents the 
sample distribution by bank status (active versus failed banks) in 
each year during the sample period 2004–2012. It shows that the 
majority of bank failure events in the U.S. took place during the 
2007-09 financial crisis. Specifically, in our sample, more than 
400 commercial banks under FDIC supervision failed after (or 
during) 2007 compared to less than 80 between 2004 and 2006. In 
light of the numerous bank failure events in the recent years, in 
our empirical analysis we investigate the suitability of the Z-
score as a measure of bank failure not only in the whole period 
(2004-2012), but also on the crisis and post-crisis period (2007-
2012). 
[Insert Table 1] 
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3. Methods 
3.1 Discrete-time proportional hazards model  
To empirically investigate whether and to what extent the Z-
score is an informative measure of bank risk, we use a discrete-
time representation of a continuous-time proportional hazards 
model, the so-called complementary log-log model where the 
dependent variable (the failed bank dummy) is a binary variable 
that takes value 0 when a bank is still active and 1 when it 
failed. 
Complementary log-log model is frequently used when the 
probability of an event is very small or very large, as the logit 
and probit models are inappropriate under such circumstances. 
Complementary log-log model belongs to the discrete-time 
functional specifications applied when survival occurs in 
continuous time, but spell length are observed only in interval as 
it is the case for bank failure recorded on annual basis in our 
sample. Guo (1993) observes that time-varying covariates offer an 
opportunity to examine the relation between the failure 
probability and the changing conditions under which the failure 
happens. The complementary log-log model with time-varying 
covariates has the following form (Männasoo and Mayes, 2009): 
log(- log[1 - h j(X)]) = j + β’X            (1)                                        
where X contains time-varying covariates for each bank at time t-
1. Traditional complementary log-log model assumes duration 
independence, i.e. the probability of surviving or failing at any 
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point in time is always the same. In order to deal with time 
dependency problems arising when using these models, we use robust 
standard errors clustered on the unit of analysis and include in 
the vector X temporal dummy variables for each period or ‘spell’. 
In addition, the complementary log-log model yields estimates of 
the impact of the indicators on the conditional probability of 
failure, which means that we obtain failure probabilities, 
conditional on surviving to a certain point in time. 
In order to examine whether the model is able to correctly 
identify failed banks, we compute two types of errors: Type I and 
Type II errors. Type I error occurs when the model fails to 
identify the failed banks (that is a missed failure). It is 
computed as the ratio of false negative (FN) events to the sum of 
false negative and true positive (TP) events. Type II error occurs 
when a healthy bank is falsely identified as failure (that is a 
false alarm). It is computed as the ratio of false positive (FP) 
events to the sum of false positive and true negative (TN) events.  
To assign a particular bank into one of the two categories 
(failed versus active), we set up a cut-off point in terms of the 
probability of bank failure. All banks above (below) that cut-off 
point are considered as failed (healthy) banks. A higher cut-off 
point results in a lower number of banks on the blacklist of 
failed banks, which tends to increase the Type I errors. Setting a 
lower cut-off point can reduce the Type I errors, but at the 
expense of generating more Type II errors. The optimal cut-off 
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point depends on the relative weights that an analyst puts on Type 
I and Type II errors. From a prudential perspective, it is 
considerate to put a larger weight on Type I errors (Persons, 
1999), because supervisors are primarily concerned about missing a 
failed bank (Poghosyan and Čihák, 2011). This implies a preference 
for relatively low cut-off points, which limit the Type I errors 
at the expense of relatively long blacklists (and potentially more 
Type II errors). For these reasons, we primarily focus on the Type 
I error results obtained using the cut-off point equal to 1 
percent.  
The analysis based on Type I and II errors is based on the 
arbitrary decision of the cut-off point. To overcome this problem, 
we also assess the accuracy of failure forecasts using the 
empirical distribution of the predicted probabilities of failure 
generated by complementary log-log model. We assign each 
observation to a decile of this empirical distribution, and we 
count how many genuine failure events fall into each decile. The 
accuracy of the model increases when a high fraction of failure 
events fall in the deciles associated to high predicted 
probabilities of failure.  
 
3.2 The estimation of Z-score 
Despite various shortcomings of Z-score, a number of 
approaches have been developed for the Z-score’s construction, and 
abundant empirical studies employ Z-score as proxy for bank risk 
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(see, e.g., Boyd and Graham, 1986; De Nicolò, 2000; Stiroh, 2004; 
Beck and Laeven, 2006; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Beck et al., 2013; 
Chiaramonte et al., 2013;  DeYoung and Torna, 2013; Liu et al., 
2013).  
We compute the Z-score following different approaches 
developed by the literature for its construction (see the variable 
definition in the Appendix). On the basis of the most common 
approach (Boyd and Graham, 1986; Hannan and Hanweck, 1988), the 
first Z-score used in our analysis (hereafter ‘Z-score 1’) is 
calculated as the sum of equity to total assets (ETA) and return 
on assets (ROA) divided by the three-year standard deviation of 
ROA (σROA). Following Maecheler et al. (2007), we also compute the 
Z-score using the three-year moving return of assets (A_ROA) plus 
the three-year moving average of equity to total assets (A_ETA) 
over the three-year standard deviation of A_ROA (σA_ROA). We label 
this type of Z-score as ‘Z-score 2’. The third way of estimation 
of the Z-score follows Boyd et al. (2006) and is calculated as the 
sum of three-year moving average of equity to total assets (A_ETA) 
and current values of return on assets (ROA) divided by the three-
year standard deviation of ROA (σROA). We label this type of Z-score 
as ‘Z-score 3’. Finally, following Laeven and Levine (2009) and 
Dam and Koetter (2012), we compute the Z-score as the sum of tier 
1 ratio (TIER 1 RATIO) and return on risk weighted assets (R_RWA) 
divided by the three-year standard deviation of R_RWA (σR_RWA). We 
label this type of Z-score as ‘Z-score 4’. Since the Z-score is 
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usually highly skewed, we use the natural logarithm of the Z-
score, which is more likely to follow normal distribution (Laeven 
and Levine, 2009; Liu et al., 2013). We label the natural 
logarithm of Z-score as lnZ. 
 
3.3 Variables 
We include several bank‐ and macro-level factors as control 
variables to capture differences in bank risk profiles that are 
associated with other bank characteristics, macroeconomic 
conditions or banking market structures. These different 
categories of indicators represent various determinants of a 
bank’s vulnerability (see Betz et al., 2014). In the Appendix, we 
describe the control variables outlined below and summarize their 
hypothesized relationships with the probability of bank failure.  
The first control variable we consider is the natural 
logarithm of a bank’s total assets as a proxy for bank size 
(SIZE). Existing literature indicates that the sign linking SIZE 
to the probability of bank failure could be uncertain. The 
relationship can be negative when growth of bank size leads to 
efficiency gains and superior ability of diversification, which 
would result in higher bank stability. On the other hand, the 
relationship may become positive when diversification strategies 
followed by large banks do not make them safer and may exacerbate 
the risk of a system-wide breakdown (Allen and Jagtiani, 2000) or 
result in higher earnings volatility while relying on the implicit 
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guarantee associated with the too-big-to-fail argument (DeYoung 
and Roland, 2001; DeJonghe, 2010, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 
2010).  
Next, we include bank diversification (DIV) as another 
control variable and measure it by the ratio of non‐interest income 
to total operating income following Stiroh (2004). We expect a 
negative sign between DIV and the probability of bank failure 
because diversification leads to risk reduction and therefore 
lower the likelihood of failure.  
In addition, we employ the ratio of the sum of cash, 
available-for-sale securities and federal funds sold to total 
assets (LIQ) as a proxy for bank liquidity. The relationship 
linking LIQ to bank failure is expected to be negative. The more 
liquid the bank is and the less vulnerable to a classic run. An 
increase in LIQ should therefore correspond to a reduction in 
probability of bank default. In addition, we include the ratio of 
non-performing loans to total assets (NPL) as a proxy for asset 
quality. The higher ratio of NPL indicates the lower quality of 
the bank loan portfolio. Hence, an increase in NPL should lead to 
an increase in probability of bank failure. Furthermore, we 
employthe cost‐to‐income ratio (CIR) as a proxy for bank 
operational efficiency. Since low values of CIR indicate better 
managerial quality, the relationship between CIR and probability 
of bank failure is expected to be positive. 
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Finally, within the bank-specific factors, we include the 
Bank Holding Company (BHC) dummy variable, which takes the value 
of 1 if the bank is owned by a BHC and 0 otherwise. We expect a 
negative sign between BHC dummy and bank failure. A bank that is a 
part of a BHC may be subject to more complex risk management and 
stricter monitoring because BHCs boards have more committees and 
meet more frequently than other boards (Adams and Mehran, 2003). 
The increased corporate governance may thus reduce the likelihood 
of bank failure.  
In our empirical analysis, we also consider the most commonly 
used macroeconomic indicators: the annual percentage change of 
gross domestic product (GDPC) and the annual inflation rate (INF). 
We expected that low GDP growth and high inflation increase bank 
vulnerability (see Betz et al., 2014). Hence, we hypothesize a 
negative sign for GDPC and a positive sign for INF. 
To measure the degree of banking system concentration, we 
determine the Herfindahl–Hirschman index (hereafter HHI). The HHI 
is calculated as the sum of the squared market share value (in 
term of total assets) of all banks in the country. The theoretical 
relationship linking HHI to bank survival is uncertain based on 
the previous studies. The competition-fragility view expects a 
positive sign as competitive markets limit the ability of banks to 
gain informational advantages from their relationships with 
borrowers, reducing their incentives to properly screen borrowers, 
thus increasing the risk of default (Allen and Gale, 2000, 2004; 
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Carletti, 2008; Beck et al., 2013). Contrary to this view, the 
competition-stability view (Boyd and De Nicolò, 2005) predicts a 
negative sign and maintains that highly competitive banking 
systems (i.e., lower HHI) result in more stability. If competition 
reduces the cost of financing, bank borrowers would be better able 
to repay their loan obligations, thus reducing the risk of bank 
failure due to credit risk. Given the unsolved contradictions of 
predictions from the existing theories, we leave the sign for the 
coefficient of the HHI variable to empirical testing. 
 
3.4 Summary statistics 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of the variables used 
in our U.S. sample for the whole sample period from 2004 to 2012, 
tabulated by bank status (active or failed). To mitigate the 
effect of outliers, we winsorize observations in the outside 1 
percent of each tail of each explanatory variable, with the 
exception of SIZE. 
As expected, active banks show higher values for the average 
lnZ than failed banks for all types of Z-score in the time period 
considered. This result can be largely explained both by a lower 
volatility of returns (proxied by the standard deviation ROA) and 
by higher average ROA values of active banks compared to failed 
banks. Failed banks also show lower level of capitalization (ETA) 
compared to active banks. Overall, the difference in terms of the 
mean test between active and failed banks for the Z-score and its 
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components is statistically significant at the 1 percent level 
during the whole period. 
With regard to bank-specific characteristics observed by bank 
status, it emerges that failed banks are larger in size than 
surviving banks. This finding is in line with that of Jin et al. 
(2011). Additionally, banks that experienced a failure showed 
poorer quality loans portfolio, lower efficiency, less diversified 
into non-interest income activities and holding less liquidity. 
All these characteristics helped healthy banks to survive during 
the period of analysis. The latter results are confirmed by the 
more recent bank failure literature (Jin et al., 2011; Dam and 
Koetter, 2012). Overall, the differences in terms of mean test 
between active and failed banks for the bank-specific variables 
are statistically significant at the 1 percent level during the 
period 2004-2012. 
We also observe low values of inflation ratio (INF) and bank 
concentration (HHI) with low variations throughout the period 
while the annual GDP growth (GDPC) shows relevant changes.  
Finally, Table 3 presents the correlation matrix for our main 
variables of interest (the four measures of Z-score), its 
components and the control variables. It shows that all the four 
Z-scores we construct are highly correlated with one another as 
expected.  It also shows that though many of the pairwise 
correlation coefficients are statistically significant, the 
correlation magnitudes are in general low. 
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[Insert Table 2 and 3] 
 
4. Main Results  
4.1 Estimates and Prediction Results 
Table 4 shows the complementary log-log models estimations 
results and also displays the relationship between model 
predictions and actual failure events (see Type I and II errors) 
using a cut-off point equals to 1 percent. In order to investigate 
to what extend Z-score is a sufficient statistic of bank failure, 
for each measures of Z-score, we test the model on Z-score alone, 
and the combination of Z-score and the common bank- and macro-
level control variables. In the final column, we also test the 
predictive power of control variables without the inclusion of Z-
score. We also include time fixed effects in all our regressions. 
The bottom of Table 4 displays the relationship between model 
predictions and actual failure events for the complementary log-
log model for the entire sample period (2004-2012) using a cut-off 
point of 1 percent.  
Table 4 shows that on average Z-score can accurately predict 
76-77 percent of bank failures. For example when Z-score 1 is the 
only independent variable included in the hazard model (and with 
year fixed effects added), the Type I error is 23.9% while the 
Type II error is 21.8%, indicating that 23.9% of the time Z-score 
1 fails to identify the failed banks and 21.8% of the time a 
healthy bank is falsely identified as a failing bank by using the 
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information of Z-score 1 only
6
. In the last column of Table 4, we 
report the results by considering alternative set of other bank-
specific and macro variables, and find that both Type I error 
(28.2%) and Type II error (27.9%) are higher than those when Z-
score alone is considered, suggesting a better predictability 
using Z-score alone in comparison to using the set of other bank-
specific and macro variables as we defined earlier as independent 
variables. For each Z-score variable, we also report the results 
by combining the Z-score and the other bank-specific and macro 
variables, and we find that the latter leads to slightly higher 
Type I errors while slightly lower Type II errors. These results 
suggest that by adding a set of other bank-specific and macro 
variables to the Z-score does not significantly improve the 
predictability of our hazard model.  
Table 4 also shows that during the period 2004-2012, the 
natural logarithm of the Z-score (lnZ) enters the models 
significantly at 1 percent level and negatively in all the cases 
considered, indicating that the significance of Z-score as a 
predictor of bank failure does not disappear once the other 
variables are controlled. The negative sign of the coefficient 
means that higher values of Z-score are indicative of lower 
likelihood of bank failure.  
                                                          
6
 We also exclude from the model the time fixed effects to examine the 
predictive power of Z-score on its own. We find that on average the exclusion 
of time fixed effects increases the Type 1 error by 10% while the Type 2 error 
remains unchanged to that reported for the models with time fixed effects. 
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In Table 4, we display that the empirical results of the 
control variables are in general consistent with our expectations. 
The positive sign of SIZE implies that larger banks take on higher 
risk which may endanger their probability of survival. Similarly, 
more concentrated banking markets result to increase the 
probability of bank default. Positive relationship is also found 
between the non-performing ratio (NPL) as a measure of asset 
quality and the probability of default. This result is consistent 
with those reported in Poghosyan and Čihák (2011) and Betz et al. 
(2014), who find that failure probabilities are influenced by the 
deterioration of the loan portfolio. Diversification (DIV) is 
found to have significant negative impact on the probability of 
bank failure when Z-score 2 (but not the other Z-scores) is 
considered, indicating that diversification leads to risk 
reduction and therefore lower the likelihood of bank failure. The 
bank’s level of liquidity (LIQ) is found to have significant 
negative impact on the probability of bank failure when Z-score 1 
and Z-score 3 (but not Z-score 2) are considered, indicating that 
banks with more liquidity are less vulnerable to bank failure. 
Cost to income ratio (CIR) as a measure of managerial inefficiency 
is also found to have a positive relationship with the likelihood 
of bank failure when Z-score 2 and 3 are considered.  
The two macro-variables, INF and GDPC, show positive and 
negative signs, respectively. Hence, high inflation and low real 
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GDP growth increase bank vulnerability, confirming the results of 
Betz et al. (2014).  
Overall, Table 4 indicates that the Z-score, in all its 
computations, is a key determinant of the probability of bank 
survival, and the additional contribution of the bank-specific and 
macro variables to predict bank default is marginal at best.  
[Insert Table 4] 
 
4.2 Default Forecasts 
The predictive accuracy of the Z-score relative to the 
control variables with or without the Z-score is further confirmed 
by the failure forecasts in Table 5. Following Bharath and Shumway 
(2008), we assess the accuracy of our complementary log-log model 
by sorting banks in deciles based on the predicted probabilities 
and calculating the percentage of defaults by decile of the sole 
forecast variable (Z-score), the combination of Z-score and bank-
specific and macro variables, and the set of control variables 
alone. Table 5 shows that the highest percentage of failure is in 
the tenth and ninth deciles (i.e. banks with the largest 
probability of failure or lowest value of Z-score) for all the 
specifications. By adding the other set of bank-specific and macro 
variables to the Z-score, however it is measured, will increase 
the predictability power of the tenth decile (for example, 64.31% 
vs. 61.59% for Z-score 1). However, the overall predictability of 
both tenth and ninth deciles remain similar (for example, 73.91% 
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vs. 73.54% for Z-score 1). Both these results with the inclusion 
of Z-scores report significant higher predictability power than 
that of control variables only. These results confirm that the Z-
score alone is a good predictor of bank failure. 
[Insert Table 5] 
 
4.3 Z-score versus Merton distance-to-default measure 
In addition to the examination of the predictability of Z-
scores to bank failure, we also examine to what extent Z-score, 
the accounting measure of bank distance-to-default, is consistent 
with the market price based Merton distance-to-default (DD), which 
is based on Merton’s (1974) bond pricing model. Studies have 
demonstrated the ability of DD measures to predict default risk 
(Elton et al., 2001; Gropp et al., 2002; Vassalou and Xing, 2004). 
Kato and Hagendorff (2010) analyze the extent to which distance to 
default based on market data can be explained using accounting-
based indicators of risk for a sample of U.S. bank holding 
companies. They show that a large number of bank fundamentals help 
to predict default for institutions that issue subordinated debt. 
However, they do not study the impact of Z-score on Merton DD. 
Gropp et al. (2002) empirically test European banks’ distances-to-
default and subordinated bond spreads in relation to their 
capability of anticipating a material weakening in banks’ 
financial conditions. They use two different econometric models: a 
logit-model and a proportional hazard model. They find support in 
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favor of using both indicators as leading indicators of bank 
fragility, regardless of the econometric specification. The 
predictive performance of the distance-to-default indicator is 
found to be robust between 6 to 18 months in advance, its 
predictive properties are quite poor closer to default.  
We follow Bharath and Shumway’s (2008) method to estimate the 
Merton DD model.
7
 We examine all U.S. banks in the CRSP/Compustat 
Merged Database from 2003 to 2012, and then merged with CRSP to 
obtain stock price data. To examine the correlation between Z-
scores and DD measure, we run a series of regressions with the 
dependent variable being the DD measure, while the independent 
variable being different measures of Z-scores. Since both are bank 
risk measures, we use system generalized method of moments (GMM) 
estimator to treat the potential endogeneity issue between them. 
The results are reported in Table 6, where we observe that all our 
Z-score measures are significantly and positively correlated with 
the DD measure, which indicates that the accounting and market 
based bank risk measures are consistent with one another. This is 
the first attempt, to the authors’ best knowledge, to examine the 
consistency of the accounting and market based bank risk measures 
and it strengthens the results in the previous sections that Z-
score is an informative and reliable measure for bank risk.  
[Insert Table 6] 
 
                                                          
7
 The SAS commands for estimating the DD model can be found in Bharath and 
Shumway (2008).  
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5. Robustness Tests 
In light of the numerous failure events that characterized 
the U.S. banking industry during the recent years, we investigate 
the suitability of the Z-score as a measure of bank risk during 
and after the crisis period of 2007-2012. Table 7 presents the 
complementary log-log models estimation results and displays the 
relationship between model predictions and actual failure events 
(see Type I and II errors) using a cut-off point equals to 1 
percent. We test the model on the Z-score alone, the model with 
the combination of Z-score and the common bank- and macro level 
control variables and the model with the sole control variables. 
Our variable of interest, lnZ, remains highly significant 
during the period of 2007-2012. The bottom of Table 7 highlights 
that during this period, the Z-score can predict bank failures 
with an accuracy of 81 percent (see Type I errors). The results 
for Type II errors also confirm the best predictive power of the 
Z-score, especially compared to the control variables alone.
8
 
 [Insert Table 7] 
We further test whether, and to which extent, the single 
components of the natural logarithm of the Z-score affect the 
probability of bank failure (see results (1) of Table 8).
9
 To this 
aim we re-estimate the complementary log-log model on the whole 
period (2003-2012), but only for our main variables of interest, 
                                                          
8
 Following Barath and Shumway (2008), we also assess the accuracy of our 
complementary log-log model for the 2007-09 financial crisis time period in an 
unreported analysis. Our main results hold.  
9
 The components of the lnZ are lagged by one year. 
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the Z-scores, given that the contribution of the control variables 
is only marginal as shown in Table 4. Results (1) of Tables 8 show 
that, regardless of how the Z-score is computed, all the three 
components significantly affect the bank probability of failure, 
with the exception of the Tier 1 ratio being insignificant. 
Finally, we check whether Z-score has predictive power two or 
three years before the failure (see results (2) and (3) of Table 
8). Therefore, we test the complementary log-log model firstly on 
a two-year lag and then on a three-year lag of the natural 
logarithm of the Z-score. We find in the results (2) and (3), that 
lnZ is strongly significant both in two and three years before 
failure with the expected negative sign. These results indicate 
that Z-score has the ability to predict bank failure even two to 
three years before the failure events. 
[Insert Table 8] 
 
6. Conclusions 
Understanding the accuracy of measures of bank soundness that 
are widely used in the empirical banking literature is an 
important theme. The numerous bank failures in modern times, 
especially those during the 2007-09 global financial crisis, 
highlight the urgency and need of effective, transparent and easy 
to implement predictors for bank failures. 
In this empirical study, we examine the accuracy and the 
contribution of the Boyd and Graham (1986) Z-score in predicting 
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bank failures, based on three main analyses and several robustness 
tests. First, we incorporate various versions of Z-score into a 
complementary log-logistic model to forecast bank failure from 
2003 through 2012. We find that Z-score is able to predict bank 
failures with the accuracy of on average 76%, while adding a set 
of other bank- and macro-level variables can only marginally 
increase the model’s predictability. Second, we compare the short-
term, out-of-sample forecasting ability of Z-score and find that 
the lowest two deciles of Z-score can predict on average 74% of 
bank failures. We also examine whether the accounting value based 
distance-to-default measure Z-score is highly correlated with the 
market based Merton distance-to-default (DD) measure. We find that 
Z-score is a significant determinant factor of Merton DD measure, 
indicative of high correlation between the two widely used bank 
risk measures. Furthermore, we find that Z-score alone can predict 
bank default with three years in advance. Finally, our main 
results survive the several robustness checks including testing 
the predicting power of the Z-score for the crisis and post-crisis 
period (2007-2012) and testing the single components of the 
natural logarithm of the Z-score affect the probability of bank 
failures. Based on the consistent and strong empirical evidence 
documented in this study, we conclude that Z-score is a useful and 
sufficient predictor for forecasting bank failure.  
Our research provides noteworthy contributions to the 
literature. The obtained empirical results justify the extensive 
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use of this bank risk measure by both academic researchers and 
practitioners. The advantage of Z-score as a simple measure, and 
its non-reliance on the publicly traded status of the bank makes 
it widely applicable to both private and publicly listed banks, 
and suitable to improve information environment for both retail 
and institutional investors. In addition, our evidence of 
establishing Z-score as an effective predictor for bank failure 
also suggests that accounting quality of banks’ earnings and 
equity is crucial for investors to derive unbiased judgment of 
bank failure risk. Thus our research calls for further studies 
aimed to investigate the effects of managerial incentives and 
various regulations on bank earnings management that could 
potentially lead to systemically underestimating bank risk. 
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Table 1. Distribution of failed and active banks over the sample 
period from 2004 to 2012 
 
This table shows the sample distribution by bank status (active banks versus 
failed banks) in each year. The numbers reported in the table refers only to 
those banks with data available to compute our main variable of interest (the 
natural logarithm of the Z-score). We obtain fourth-quarter data from 2004 to 
2012 on private and public commercial banks in the US from the Reports on 
Condition and Income (“Call Reports”) submitted by insured banks to the Federal 
Reserve.  
 
Year 
Bank-year observation 
Failed Active Total 
2004 9 6,985 6,994 
2005 4 6,779 6,783 
2006 26 6,607 6,632 
2007 40 6,453 6,493 
2008 134 6,350 6,484 
2009 154 6,265 6,419 
2010 96 6,178 6,274 
2011 68 6,936 6,004 
2012 22 5,912 5,934 
Total 552 57,465 58,017 
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Table 2. Summary statistics of variables by failed and active banks 
 
This table reports the summery statistics of the four different measures of the natural logarithm of the Z-score (i.e. our 
main variable of interest), of its components and of the control variables (bank-specific and macro factors) used in our 
analysis. We report only the descriptive statistics for the components of the Z-score 1 given that the components of the 
other different types of Z-score show a similar trend. The estimates are done by bank status and on the full sample, with 
the sole exception of the macro variables that are observed only with reference to the whole sample. The ‘full sample’ 
includes the failed and active banks. The descriptive statistics are referred to the whole period (2004-2012). To mitigate 
the effect of outliers, we winsorize observations in the outside 1 percent of each tail of each variable, except for SIZE, 
GDPC, INF and HHI. All the variables, except SIZE and HHI, are in percentage.The numbers reported in the table refers only 
to those banks with data available to compute our main variable of interest (the natural logarithm of the Z-score). See 
the Appendix for the description of different Z-score and of the control variables used in the paper. ***, **, and * are 
referred to the two-sided unpaired t-test statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
 ACTIVE BANKS  FAILED BANKS ACTIVE and 
FAILED 
BANKS 
difference
s 
FULL SAMPLE 
Variable
s 
N. of  
observatio
n 
Mean 
 
Standard 
Deviatio
n 
 N. of  
observatio
n 
Mean 
 
Standard 
Deviatio
n 
N. of  
observatio
n 
Mean 
 
Standard 
Deviatio
n 
lnZ, (Z-
score 1) 
57,571 3.938 1.178  552 2.254 1.714 1.684*** 59,784 3.916 1.196 
lnZ, (Z-
score 2) 
57,571 3.963 1.121  552 2.604 1.363 1.359*** 59,784 3.945 1.131 
lnZ, (Z-
score 3) 
57,571 3.959 1.129  552 2.495 1.467 1.464*** 59,784 3.940 1.143 
lnZ, (Z-
score 4) 
57,571 3.867 1.190  552 2.133 1.690 1.734*** 59,784 3.844 1.209 
ETA 57,571 11.22
4 
7.161  552 9.902 8.802 1.322*** 59,784 11.212 7.206 
ROA 57,571 0.883 2.317  552 -
1.086 
8.271 1.969*** 59,784 0.858 2.439 
σROA 57,571 0.440 1.008  552 1.607 5.008 -1.167*** 59,784 0.453 1.122 
SIZE 57,571 11.86
0 
1.311  552 12.37
3 
1.396 -0.513*** 59,784 11.869 1.319 
DIV 57,567 16.83 12.386  552 15.50 16.759 1.326* 59,777 16.843 12.467 
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1 5 
LIQ 57,571 12.79
7 
12.519  552 10.30
7 
10.550 2.490*** 59,784 12.768 12.532 
NPL 57,571 0.157 0.318  552 0.264 0.492 -0.107*** 59,784 0.157 0.320 
CIR 57,567 46.59
8 
13.616  552 53.83
0 
23.058 -7.232*** 59,777 46.631 13.830 
GDPC         59,784 1.641 1.946 
INF         59,784 2.344 0.779 
HHI         59,784 452.97
9 
88.277 
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Table 3. Correlations  
 
This table shows the correlation matrix for the explanatory variables used in the empirical analysis: the four different 
measures of the natural logarithm of the Z-score (lnZ), our main variable of interest; the components of lnZ; and the 
control variables. We report only the results for the components of the Z-score 1 given that the correlations for the 
components of the other types of Z-score show the correct sign and are very low. See the Appendix for the description of 
the explanatory variables used in the paper. Data in the table are referred to the whole period: 2004–2012 (latest data 
available). The numbers reported in the table refers only to those banks with data available to compute our variable of 
interest (the natural logarithm of the Z-score). * indicates statistically significance at the 10% level. 
 
 
lnZ,  
(Z-
score 
1) 
lnZ, 
(Z-
score 
2) 
lnZ, 
(Z-
score 
3) 
lnZ, 
(Z-
score 
4) 
ETA ROA σROA SIZE DIV LIQ NPL CIR GDPC INF HHI 
lnZ, (Z-score 
1) 
1.000               
lnZ, (Z-score 
2) 
0.989* 1.000              
lnZ, (Z-score 
3) 
0.992* 0.999* 1.000             
lnZ, (Z-score 
4) 
0.950* 0.935* 0.939* 1.000            
ETA 0.076* 0.063* 0.065* 0.048* 1.000           
ROA 0.223* 0.185* 0.200* 0.223* 0.283* 1.000          
σROA -
0.503* 
-
0.489* 
-
0.490* 
-
0.503* 
0.309* 0.180* 1.000         
SIZE -
0.032* 
-
0.210* 
-
0.020* 
-
0.028* 
-
0.034* 
-
0.037* 
-
0.058* 
1.000        
DIV -
0.022* 
0.351* 0.241* 0.205* -
0.036* 
-
0.034* 
-
0.034* 
0.172* 1.000       
LIQ 0.024* 0.264* 0.045* 0.087* 0.027* 0.027* 0.043* -
0.280* 
0.114* 1.000      
NPL -
0.037* 
-
0.019* 
-
0.013* 
0.011* -
0.036* 
-
0.040* 
-
0.031* 
-
0.057* 
-
0.015* 
-0.004 1.000     
CIR -
0.264* 
-0.006 -
0.331* 
0.116* -
0.228* 
-
0.233* 
-
0.271* 
-
0.254* 
-
0.103* 
0.063* -
0.035* 
1.000    
GDPC 0.207* -
0.253* 
0.107* -
0.105* 
0.188* 0.199* 0.200* -
0.051* 
0.010* 0.006 -
0.039* 
-
0.089* 
1.000   
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INF 0.243* -0.006 0.096* -
0.122* 
0.234* 0.239* 0.226* -
0.018* 
-0.001 -
0.048* 
-
0.029* 
-
0.040* 
0.654* 1.000  
HHI -
0.182* 
0.048* -
0.086* 
0.091* -
0.173* 
-
0.179* 
-
0.173* 
0.095* -
0.043* 
-
0.034* 
-
0.010* 
0.098* -
0.462* 
-
0.127* 
1.000 
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Table 4. Complementary log-log model estimations results and Type I and II Errors  
This table shows a comparison of the complementary log-log model results obtained using alternatively the four different 
Z-score measures (i.e. our main variable of interest) alone and with the control variables. Finally, we also test the 
complementary log-log model on the control variables only (see last column). Each regressions is tested on the whole 
period, 2004-2012 (latest data available). The different types of the Z-score and the control variables used in this paper 
are described in the Appendix. Year dummy variables are also incorporated in the model. The robust standard errors of the 
estimated coefficients are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote coefficients statistically different from zero 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels in two-tailed tests, respectively. This table also displays the relationship between model 
predictions and actual failure events on the full sample for the whole period (see Panel A) using a cut-off point equals 
to 0.01. TP stands for ‘True Positive’; FN stands for ‘False Negative’; FP stands for ‘False Positive’; TN stands for 
‘True Negative’. Type I error occurs when the model fails to identify the failed bank. It is computed as: FN/(FN+TP). Type 
II error occurs when a healthy bank is falsely identified as failed (i.e. a false alarm). It is computed as: FP/(FP+TN). 
 
 
Variables 
Z-score 1 Z-score 2 Z-score 3 Z-score 4  Control 
variables  
only 
lnZ only lnZ and 
the 
control 
variables 
lnZ only lnZ and 
the 
control 
variables 
lnZ only lnZ and 
the 
control 
variables 
lnZ only lnZ and 
the 
control 
variables 
 
lnZ (-1) -0.862*** 
(0.029) 
-0.838*** 
(0.032) 
-0.986*** 
(0.041) 
-0.933*** 
(0.044) 
-0.967*** 
(0.037) 
-0.917*** 
(0.040) 
-0.821*** 
(0.033) 
-0.809*** 
(0.030) 
  
SIZE (-1)  0.171*** 
(0.030) 
 0.192*** 
(0.029) 
 0.181*** 
(0.029) 
 0.153*** 
(0.029) 
 0.252*** 
(0.030) 
DIV (-1)  -0.005 
(0.003) 
 -0.007* 
(0.004) 
 -0.006 
(0.004) 
 -0.006 
(0.003) 
 -0.001 
(0.005) 
LIQ (-1)  -0.009* 
(0.005) 
 -0.008 
(0.005) 
 -0.009* 
(0.005) 
 -0.008 
(0.005) 
 -0.011* 
(0.004) 
NPL (-1)  0.366*** 
(0.093) 
 0.380*** 
(0.092) 
 0.358*** 
(0.092) 
 0.392*** 
(0.093) 
 0.651*** 
(0.092) 
CIR (-1)  0.001 
(0.002) 
 0.005** 
(0.002) 
 0.004* 
(0.002) 
 -0.0004 
(0.002) 
 0.013*** 
(0.001) 
GDPC (-1)  -0.224*** 
(0.032) 
 -0.270*** 
(0.033) 
 -0.243*** 
(0.032) 
 -0.215*** 
(0.032) 
 -0.197*** 
(0.031) 
INF (-1)  1.009*** 
(0.110) 
 1.073*** 
(0.111) 
 1.023*** 
(0.110) 
 0.955*** 
(0.110) 
 0.651*** 
(0.108) 
HHI (-1)  0.020*** 
(0.002) 
 0.022*** 
(0.002) 
 0.021*** 
(0.002) 
 0.020*** 
(0.002) 
 0.017*** 
(0.002) 
BHC dummy  -0.052 
(0.113) 
 -0.100 
(0.113) 
 -0.137 
(0.113) 
 -0.015 
(0.113) 
 -0.259* 
(0.114) 
Year 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
N. of 
Obs. 
58,123 58,119 58,123 58,119 58,123 58,119 58,123 58,119  75,197 
Type 
Errors: 
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TP 420 414 423 415 422 412 417 416  439 
FN 132 138 129 137 130 140 135 136  173 
FP 12,563 12,130 13,419 12,827 13,016 12,503 12,571 12,171  20,856 
TN 45,008 45,437 44,152 44,740 44,555 45,064 45,000 45,396  53,729 
Type I  0.239 0.250 0.233 0.248 0.235 0.253 0.244 0.246  0.282 
Type II  0.218 0.210 0.233 0.222 0.226 0.217 0.218 0.211  0.279 
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Table 5. Default Forecasts 
 
This table reports the frequencies of default events by deciles of the distribution of the predicted probabilities 
for the complementary log-log model on the whole period (2004-2012), presented in Table 4. Decile 10 (1) is the 
decile with the highest (lowest) predicted probabilities of failure events. The model is tested on our main 
variable of interest, i.e., the natural logarithm of the Z-score (lnZ), the natural logarithm of the Z-score plus 
the control variables and on the control variables only (see last column). 
 
 
 
Deciles 
Z-score 1 Z-score 2 Z-score 3 Z-score 4  Control 
variables  
only 
lnZ 
only 
lnZ and 
control 
variables 
lnZ only lnZ and 
control 
variables 
lnZ only lnZ and 
control 
variables 
lnZ only lnZ and 
control 
variables 
 
10 0.6159 0.6431 0.5923 0.6304 0.5996 0.6394 0.6195 0.6394  0.4362 
9 0.1195 0.0960 0.1340 0.1014 0.1340 0.0942 0.1159 0.1068  0.1944 
8 0.0797 0.0815 0.0851 0.0923 0.0742 0.0905 0.0797 0.0778  0.0996 
7 0.0452 0.0489 0.0416 0.0434 0.0489 0.0434 0.0507 0.0452  0.0915 
6 0.0380 0.0326 0.0398 0.0271 0.0380 0.0307 0.0489 0.0434  0.0522 
1-5 0.1014 0.0978 0.1068 0.1050 0.1050 0.1014 0.0851 0.0869  0.1258 
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Table 6. Comparison with Merton distance default (DD) model 
 
This table compares the Z-score by Merton (1974) distance default model. The 
three different types of the Z-score used are described in the Appendix. We 
follow Bharath and Shumway’s (2008) method to estimate the DD model. We examine 
all banks in the CRSP/Compustat Merged Database from 2004 to 2012, and then 
merged with CRSP for stock price data.  We use System GMM estimator with 
Windmeijer correction to all the regressions to address the potential 
endogeneity between the two bank stability measures. Hansen is the p-value of 
Hansen test statistic of over-identifying restrictions, while AR(2) is the p-
value the second order autocorrelation test statistic. ***, **, and * denote 
the statistical significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
lnZ (Z-score 1) 0.737* 
(0.093) 
  
lnZ (Z-score 2)  0.900** 
(0.017) 
 
lnZ (Z-score 3)   0.846** 
(0.021) 
Constant 1.384 
(0.407) 
0.694 
(0.626) 
0.920 
(0.501) 
N. of Obs. 5,689 5,795 5,795 
Hansen 0.47 0.34 0.38 
AR (2) 0.98 0.96 0.97 
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Table 7. Complementary log-log model estimations results and Type I and II Errors in the financial 
crisis period 
This table shows a comparison of the complementary log-log model results obtained using alternatively the four 
different Z-score measures (i.e. our main variable of interest) alone and with the control variables. Finally, we also 
test the complementary log-log model on the control variables only (see last column). Each regressions is tested on 
the crisis period, 2007-2012 (latest data available). The different types of the Z-score and the control variables 
used in this paper are described in the Appendix. Year dummy variables are also incorporated in the model. The robust 
standard errors of the estimated coefficients are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote coefficients 
statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels in two-tailed tests, respectively. This table also 
displays the relationship between model predictions and actual failure events on the full sample for the whole period 
(see Panel A) using a cut-off point equals to 0.01. TP stands for ‘True Positive’; FN stands for ‘False Negative’; FP 
stands for ‘False Positive’; TN stands for ‘True Negative’. Type I error occurs when the model fails to identify the 
failed bank and is computed as: FN/(FN+TP). Type II error occurs when a healthy bank is falsely identified as failed 
(i.e. a false alarm) and is computed as: FP/(FP+TN). 
 
 
Variables 
Z-score 1 Z-score 2 Z-score 3 Z-score 4 Control 
variables  
only 
lnZ only lnZ and the 
control 
variables 
lnZ only lnZ and the 
control 
variables 
lnZ only lnZ and the 
control 
variables 
lnZ only lnZ and the 
control 
variables 
lnZ (-1) -0.879*** 
(0.030) 
-0.850*** 
(0.033) 
-1.020*** 
(0.042) 
-0.960*** 
(0.046) 
-0.994*** 
(0.038) 
-0.935*** 
(0.042) 
-0.837*** 
(0.027) 
-0.820*** 
(0.031) 
 
SIZE (-1)  0.170*** 
(0.032) 
 0.190*** 
(0.031) 
 0.179*** 
(0.031) 
 0.152*** 
(0.031) 
0.304*** 
(0.031) 
DIV (-1)  -0.009* 
(0.004) 
 -0.011** 
(0.004) 
 -0.010* 
(0.004) 
 -0.010* 
(0.004) 
-0.018* 
(0.007) 
LIQ (-1)  -0.012* 
(0.005) 
 -0.011* 
(0.005) 
 -0.011* 
(0.005) 
 -0.010* 
(0.005) 
-0.016** 
(0.004) 
NPL (-1)  0.388*** 
(0.094) 
 0.400*** 
(0.093) 
 0.379*** 
(0.093) 
 0.412*** 
(0.094) 
0.686*** 
(0.094) 
CIR (-1)  0.001 
(0.002) 
 0.005** 
(0.002) 
 0.005* 
(0.002) 
 -0.0003 
(0.002) 
0.015*** 
(0.001) 
GDPC (-1)  -0.224*** 
(0.032) 
 -0.272*** 
(0.033) 
 -0.243*** 
(0.032) 
 -0.215*** 
(0.032) 
-0.196*** 
(0.031) 
INF (-1)  1.012*** 
(0.111) 
 1.083*** 
(0.112) 
 1.027*** 
(0.111) 
 0.956*** 
(0.111) 
0.642*** 
(0.109) 
HHI (-1)  0.020*** 
(0.002) 
 0.022*** 
(0.002) 
 0.021*** 
(0.002) 
 0.020*** 
(0.002) 
0.017*** 
(0.002) 
BHC dummy  0.066 
(0.120) 
 0.015 
(0.121) 
 -0.023 
(0.121) 
 0.107 
(0.121) 
0.001 
(0.128) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N. of Obs. 37,714 37,710 37,714 37,710 37,714 37,710 37,714 37,710 39,103 
Type Errors:          
TP 413 410 415 409 413 407 412 414 426 
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FN 101 104 99 105 101 107 102 100 111 
FP 11,884 11,475 12,580 11,999 12,250 11,765 11,930 11,570 19,617 
TN 25,316 25,721 24,620 25,197 24,950 25,431 25,270 25,626 18,949 
Type I  0.196 0.202 0.192 0.204 0.196 0.208 0.198 0.194 0.206 
Type II  0.319 0.308 0.338 0.322 0.329 0.316 0.320 0.311 0.508 
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Table 8. Complementary log-log model estimations results (components of lnZ and its lagged) 
 
This table reports the results obtained testing the complementary log-log models over the whole period 2004-2012 for: (1) the 
components of the natural logarithm of the Z-score (lnZ) and (2) the second lag and (3) the third lag of the Z-score. The 
different types of Z-score and their components are described in the Appendix. The dependent variable (the defaulted bank 
dummy variable) that takes the value of 1 if bank i becomes failed at time t (the year in progress) and 0 otherwise. All 
explanatory variables are lagged by one year. To mitigate the effect of outliers, we winsorize observations in the outside 1 
percent of each tail of each variable. Year dummy variables are also incorporated in the model. These findings were obtained 
using unconsolidated bank statements. The robust standard errors of the estimated coefficients are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote coefficients statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels in two-tailed tests, 
respectively. This table also displays the relationship between model predictions and actual failure events on the full 
sample for the whole period, using a cut-off point equals to 0.01. We also tested the regressions using a cut-off point equal 
to 0.10 rather than 0.01 and we obtained very similar results.TP stands for ‘True Positive’; FN stands for ‘False Negative’; 
FP stands for ‘False Positive’; TN stands for ‘True Negative’. Type I error occurs when the model fails to identify the 
failed bank and is computed as: FN/(FN+TP). Type II error occurs when a healthy bank is falsely identified as failed (i.e. a 
false alarm) and is computed as: FP/(FP+TN). 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Z-score 
1 
Z-score 
2 
Z-score 
3 
Z-score 
4 
Z-score 
1 
Z-score 
2 
Z-score 
3 
Z-score 
4 
Z-score 
1 
Z-score 
2 
Z-score 
3 
Z-score 
4 
lnZ (-2)     -
0.581*** 
(0.033) 
-
0.630*** 
(0.041) 
-
0.628*** 
(0.039) 
-
0.562*** 
(0.030) 
    
lnZ (-3)         -
0.438*** 
(0.038) 
-
0.457*** 
(0.042) 
-
0.456*** 
(0.041) 
-
0.437*** 
(0.034) 
ETA -
0.099*** 
(0.028) 
           
ROA -
0.059*** 
(0.013) 
 -0.095** 
(0.034) 
         
σROA 0.286*** 
(0.027) 
 0.233*** 
(0.056) 
         
A_ETA  -0.102* 
(0.041) 
-0.052** 
(0.017) 
         
A_ROA  -
0.197*** 
(0.025) 
          
σA_ROA  0.380*** 
(0.057) 
          
TIER 1 
RATIO 
   -0.0006 
(0.001) 
        
R_RWA    -0.012* 
(0.005) 
        
σR_RWA    0.0007* 
(0.0003) 
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Year 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N. of 
Obs. 
58,125 42,555 58,125 58,125 50,247 50,247 50,247 50,247 42,654 42,654 42,654 42,654 
Type 
Errors: 
            
TP 432 391 443 442 407 406 404 407 389 388 388 388 
FN 120 105 119 120 118 119 121 118 111 112 112 112 
FP 19,236 18,596 20,477 20,460 17,256 17,687 17,400 17,201 19,086 19,168 19,110 18,925 
TN 38,337 23,463 37,096 37,103 32,466 32,035 32,322 32,521 23,068 22,986 23,044 23,229 
Type I  0.217 0.211 0.211 0.213 0.224 0.226 0.230 0.224 0.222 0.224 0.224 0.224 
Type II  0.334 0.442 0.355 0.355 0.347 0.355 0.349 0.345 0.452 0.454 0.453 0.448 
 
 
Appendix: Variable Definitions 
 
This appendix describes the natural logarithm of the Z-score (i.e. our main variable of interest) computed in our paper 
following the different approaches developed by the literature for its construction and the definition of the control 
variables used. The table summarizes also their hypothesized relationships with the dependent variable (the failed bank dummy 
variable).   
Variables Definition Expected sign 
Main variables of interest: 
lnZ (Z-score 1) The sum of equity to total assets (ETA) and return on 
average assets (ROA) over the three-year standard 
deviation of ROA (σROA). See Boyd and Graham (1986) and 
Hannan and Hanweck (1988). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NEGATIVE 
lnZ (Z-score 2) The sum of the three-year moving average of equity to 
total assets (A_ETA) and the three-year moving return 
of average assets (A_ROA) over the three-year standard 
deviation of A_ROA (σA_ROA). See Maecheler et al. (2007).  
lnZ (Z-score 3) The sum of the three-year moving average of equity to 
total assets (A_ETA) and the current values of return 
on average assets (ROA) over the three-year standard 
deviation of ROA (σROA). See Boyd et al. (2006). 
lnZ (Z-score 4) The sum of tier 1 ratio (TIER 1 RATIO) and return on 
risk weighted assets (R_RWA) over the three-year 
standard deviation of R_RWA (σR_RWA). See Laeven and 
Levine (2009) and Dam and Koetter (2012). 
   
Control variables: 
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets (thousands of 
dollars) 
POSITIVE/NEGATIVE 
DIV The ratio of Non-interest income to net operating NEGATIVE 
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revenue 
LIQ The ratio of the sum of cash, for sale securities and 
federal funds sold to total assets 
NEGATIVE 
NPL The ratio of Non-performing loans to total assets POSITIVE 
CIR The ratio of Operating expenses to operating income POSITIVE 
BHC dummy 1 if the bank is a member of a BHC; 0 otherwise NEGATIVE 
GDPC Annual percentage change of gross domestic product NEGATIVE 
INF Inflation rate (annual percentage change of GDP 
deflator) 
POSITIVE 
HHI Sum of the squared market share value (in term of 
total assets) of all banks in a year 
POSITIVE/NEGATIVE 
 
 
